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ETERNAL RECURRENCE IN A
NEO-KANTIAN CONTEXT
Michael Steven Green*
msgre2@wm.edu
RESUMO Neste ensaio, argumento que qualquer um que adotasse um
falsificacionismo do tipo que tenho atribuído a Nietzsche se sentiria atraído
pela doutrina do eterno retorno. Para Nietzsche, pensar o ‘vir a ser’ revelado
por meio dos sentidos significa falsificá-lo por meio do ‘ser’. Mas o eterno
retorno oferece a possibilidade de pensar o ‘vir a ser’ sem falsificação. Em
seguida, argumento que qualquer um que mantenha o falsificacionismo de
Nietzsche veria na ação humana um conflito entre o ‘ser’ e o ‘vir a ser’,
de modo semelhante ao que ocorre no juízo empírico. À luz desse conflito
apenas o eterno retorno ofereceria a possibilidade de afirmar a vida de modo
verdadeiro. Para concluir, discuto de que maneira tal leitura do eterno retorno
resolve uma série de enigmas que têm atormentado os intérpretes.
Palavras-chave Nietzsche, Afrikan Spir, eterno retorno, ser, vir a ser,
falsificação.
ABSTRACT In this essay, I argue that someone who adopted a
falsificationism of the sort that I have attributed to Nietzsche would be
attracted to the doctrine of eternal recurrence. For Nietzsche, to think the
becoming revealed through the senses means falsifying it through being. But
the eternal recurrence offers the possibility of thinking becoming without
*
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falsification. I then argue that someone who held Nietzsche’s falsificationism
would see in human agency a conflict between being and becoming similar
to that in empirical judgment. In the light of this conflict only the eternal
recurrence would offer the possibility of truly affirming life. I end by
discussing how this reading of the eternal recurrence solves a number of
puzzles that have bedeviled interpreters.
Keywords Nietzsche, Afrikan Spir, eternal recurrence, being, becoming,
falsification.

My goal in this essay is to use Afrikan Spir’s influence to situate
Nietzsche’s theory of the eternal recurrence (ER) into a broadly Neo-Kantian
framework. My primary focus will not be Nietzsche’s own discussion
of ER, whether in Zarathustra, The Gay Science, or the Nachlaß. I will,
instead, approach the matter indirectly, by arguing that someone who took
an epistemological position like the one I have attributed to Nietzsche – a
position derived from Spir’s thought – would be motivated to adopt something
like ER. In the course of my argument, I will consider previously unexplored
issues of moral agency, pessimism and asceticism in Spir’s philosophy.
Although I will not discuss here whether there is evidence for my
interpretation in Nietzsche’s own comments about ER, I think that even
without considering such evidence my reading has substantial indirect
evidence in its favor. This is so not merely because it ties ER to other
significant aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, such as his falsificationism, but
also because of its ability to answer a number of puzzles about the doctrine.
My argument will proceed as follows. I will first briefly outline the
reading of Nietzsche’s epistemology that I offered in Nietzsche and the
Transcendental Tradition,1 a reading that depends heavily upon the influence
exerted upon Nietzsche by Denken und Wirklichkeit, a book written by the
obscure Russian philosopher Afrikan Spir.2 I start with Spir’s critique of Kant
(especially of Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time) and then move on to
Spir’s reformulation of Kant’s philosophy. For Spir, there is a fundamental
incoherence to empirical judgment. What it seeks to explain is becoming
revealed to us by the senses, but doing so requires seeing becoming from the
1
2

Green, 2002.
Spir, 1877. All citations to this work will be embedded in the text.
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perspective of being, even though, in the end, no relationship between the two
can be established. This is, as Spir puts it, the fundamental antinomy (I:37786). Although becoming is real, it is, nevertheless, false: it is an inexplicable
deviation from the true nature of reality, which is an unconditioned unity
– a perfectly simple Parmenidean One. I then offer Nietzsche’s own
falsificationism, which is an inverted version of Spir’s. For Nietzsche, the
fundamental nature of reality is becoming and concepts of being falsify.
Next, I suggest how ER might play an important epistemological function
for someone who holds Nietzsche’s falsificationism. Although the world is
essentially becoming, this cannot be thought. The very process of thought
falsifies, because it involves seeing becoming from the perspective of being.
ER arguably allows the true nature of becoming to reveal itself even in the
context of thought.
I then consider questions of agency and the value of life in Spir’s
thought. Spir sees the sources of human action – pain and dissatisfaction –
as inexplicable deviations from being. They are false or evil [Uebel] (I:224;
I:382). The realization, through suffering, that reality is an unconditioned
unity, Spir argues, is religiosity, and it stands behind an acknowledgement
of the moral law. In contrast, Nietzsche adopted what Spir might call an antireligious attitude, in which pain and dissatisfaction are affirmed. But how is
such affirmation possible when pain and dissatisfaction, as becoming, cannot
be thought – when thinking them means seeing them from the perspective of
being? It is here, I argue, that ER can play a role. I end by discussing how this
reading solves a number of puzzles about ER that have bedeviled interpreters.
Nietzsche’s Spirean Epistemology
In this section, I want to briefly outline the account of Nietzsche’s
epistemology that I presented in Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition.
I’ll begin with Spir’s critique of Kant.
Kant had an anti-naturalist account of cognition. The unification of
particulars that occurs in thought cannot be explained empirically.3 Here
his particular target was Hume. To the extent that we understand a causal
judgment as the product of psychological laws of association, as Hume did,
there is no thought – no representation – of causal connection at all.4 The fact
that the mind moves from the idea of a cause to the idea of an effect does not

3
4

Kant, 1965, B142.
Ibidem, B4-5.
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mean that these two particulars are united together in thought and, thus, have
the capacity to represent anything.
Kant insisted that the cognitive unifications of particulars in a judgment
cannot be known empirically. The unity of thought is evident not in experience
but rather through experience, that is, through the fact that experience occurs
to a unified subject.5 To be sure, Kant did not think that we have some special
non-sensory knowledge – some intellectual intuition – of this self as an object.6
But insofar, as we think, we are aware of it as a unitary subject.
But if the self that thinks is a unity, how can it think sensations,
occurring as they do successively? How does the flow of sensation connect
to the thinking self? Kant appeals to “schemata,” which are rules created by
the imagination for connecting sensory intuition to concepts.7 For example,
although my sensations of a dog appear successively, I am thinking of a dog
in connection with those sensations (rather than simply letting my mind
drift from one sensation to another) if I possess “a rule according to which
my imagination can always draw a general outline of the figure of a fourfooted animal, without being restricted to any particular figure supplied by
experience or to any possible image which I may draw in the concrete.”8
With respect to pure concepts of the understanding (that is, the
fundamental logical forms of the unity in judgments), which have no
specific empirical markers for their application, Kant argues that the relevant
schemata are general rules for the unification of temporal succession within
consciousness.9 For example, Kant describes the schema of substance as “the
permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a
substrate of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding
while all else changes.”10 It is only through this synthesis by the imagination
that the succession of sensations can be thought. The role of this synthesis is
evident in the Analogies of Experience, in which Kant argues that succession
can be represented only by reference to underlying substances and causal
relations.11
But how does the imagination perform this function? How can it connect
thought – which is a unity standing above succession – to sensations – which

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Ibidem, B131-33.
Ibidem, B131-33
Ibidem, A77-78/B102-03, A137-42/B176-81.
Ibidem, A141/B180.
Ibidem, A142/B181.
Ibidem, A143/B183.
Ibidem, A178/B218-A218/B265.

ETERNAL RECURRENCE IN A NEO-KANTIAN CONTEXT

463

are themselves successive? As Spir reads it, the heart of Kant’s solution is his
view that time is an a priori intuition not given passively by sensory content
itself. As originally presented, sensations have no succession. They appear
successive only after they have been taken up by the representing subject.
Because sensory content is, in itself, not successive, the imagination’s activities
can take place outside time, allowing it to bridge sensation and thought.
But in an argument that was of great importance to Nietzsche (and quoted
by him in Philosophy and the Tragic Age of the Greeks), Spir argues that
change and succession are objectively real:
The actual fact is that one cannot deny the reality of change. If you throw it out
the window, it will slip back in again through the keyhole. One can say: “It merely
seems to me that representations and conditions change,” but this semblance is itself
something objectively given. Within it, succession indubitably has objective reality;
within it something actually follows upon something else. (I:209-10)

That change is objectively real is evident in the fact that our thoughts
themselves change.12
Spir argues that once change (or becoming) is recognized as objectively
real, Kant loses the ability to explain how sensory content is taken up by
the thinking subject (I:13-19). The sensory and cognitive elements separate
in empirical judgment. One way of formulating Spir’s position is in terms
of the Kantian antinomies. Kant, of course, thinks the contradictions of
the antinomies arise only when categories such as substance and causality
are taken beyond all possible experience.13 It is only then that we find
ourselves compelled to both accept and reject the unconditioned, such as first
causes or absolutely simple substances. For Spir, in contrast, our everyday
empirical judgments suffer from the antinomies. They show the failure of
thought to connect to the change we are presented with in our sensations.
The antinomies are a manifestation of the failure of empirical judgment to
succeed in its project of thinking change. To think change one must put it in
relation to being (that is, to the thesis position in the antinomies). But such a
relation is impossible. This is the fundamental antinomy [“die fundamentale
Antinomie”] (I:377).
As I put it in Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition, Spir argues
that empirical judgments are false because their objects are contradictory in

12 As Nietzsche puts it: “[I]f thinking in concepts, on the part of reason, is real, then the many and motion
must partake of reality also, for reasoned thinking is mobile” (PTAG 13).
13 Kant, 1965, A405-567/B432-595.
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this sense.14 And Spir does indeed speak of empirical objects as having “a real
contradiction” [einen realen Widerspruch], because they contain elements that
are foreign to their essence (I:349-50). But an alternative way of putting Spir’s
falsificationism – one more in keeping with Spir’s own emphasis in Denken
und Wirklichkeit – is that sensations, upon which empirical judgments are
based, are false. Because they present us with plurality and change, sensations
are contrary to the essence of the world, which is an unconditioned unity.
Becoming, although real, is abnormal: it is an inexplicable deviation from
being.15
In some respects Nietzsche’s falsificationism mirrors Spir’s. For
Nietzsche too, the problem with empirical judgment is that it seeks a
connection between the conditioned and the unconditioned, between
becoming and being.16 But for Nietzsche it is being that is the source of
falsity.17 Another important disanalogy between Nietzsche’s falsificationism
and Spir’s is the following: For Spir, becoming, although false, is real.
Nietzsche, in contrast, is a monist – all that exists is becoming. He does not
argue that being, although real, is an inexplicable deviation from becoming.
Being does not exist at all. Becoming somehow creates the deception of
being.18
As I argued in Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition, I think that
this position is unstable. The heart of Nietzsche’s falsificationism is that being
– the thesis positions in the antinomies – falsifies. Being is the objective
correlate to the unity of the thinking self. But if all that exists is becoming, no
such unity exists, thus removing the argument for falsificationism. Consider
a causal judgment. If all that exists is becoming, then shouldn’t there be
nothing more to this judgment than the fact that my thoughts flow from cause
to effect? The unity of the judgment is an illusion. But if that is the case, then
there is no reason to conclude that in making a causal judgment I impose the
unconditioned upon becoming. There is no reason to think causal judgments
are false.
This instability in Nietzsche’s falsificationism motivated him to adopt
two other positions. The first is noncognitivism: Nietzsche retains an

14
15
16
17

E.g., Green, 2002, pp. 58, 62.
Lessing, 1900, p. 49.
See e.g., Green, 2002, pp. 63-87.
TI III:2 (“It is what we make of [the senses’] evidence that first introduces a lie into it, for example the lie
of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of duration...‘Reason’ is the cause of our falsification of the
evidence of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie.”).
18 E.g., KSA 9:11[329] (Spring-Autumn 1881). See generally Green, 2002, pp. 67-70, 92-93.
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antinaturalist theory of cognition and concludes, not that our judgments are
false, but that they do not count as thought at all, and so are neither true, nor
false.19 In the second position, Nietzsche embraces a naturalized theory of
cognition, which allows for thought without falsification. This second position
is the dominant one in Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, and is evident, for
example, in the readings of Nietzsche’s epistemology provided by Maude
Clark and Brian Leiter. Nevertheless, the Spirean influences upon Nietzsche
were sufficiently strong that he returned again and again to falsificationism,
not merely in his Nachlaß but also in his published works, right up to the end
of his period of productivity in the winter of 1888-89.20
The Epistemological Role of the Eternal Recurrence
Let us now consider how someone committed to Nietzsche’s version of
Spirean falsificationism might be inclined to offer ER as a means of thinking
becoming. In offering this argument, I will concentrate on the idea of becoming
as force [Kraft].
As we have seen, for both Nietzsche and Spir, becoming can be thought
only through the imposition of being. As Spir puts it, the change revealed
through the senses is a “creation out of nothingness” (I:214). In themselves,
sensations arise out of nowhere and disappear into nothing. But even though
we are directly aware of this change, we cannot think it without denying its
reality. To think sensations together, some connection must be found between
them (I:215-16). But because that means establishing a relationship to the
unconditioned, the result is denying that change is the true essence of reality
(I:218).
This inability to think becoming without being is evident in Spir’s
discussion of causal judgments. Imagine that there is change – say, a billiard
ball moves.21 To think this change, I must link it to another change under a
necessary law (I:268-69). The billiard ball moved, for example, because of
the movement of the cue ball that bumped into it. Change is, so to speak,
pushed out of the explained event and into another which, in turn, must have
its change pushed out of it and into another, and so on.

19 See especially Green, 2002, Ch. 4.
20 Green, 2002, Ch. 1; Hussain, 2004, pp. 355-358; Anderson, 1996, pp. 307-341.
21 Of course, to even speak of a billiard ball, one has already falsified the plurality of becoming by treating the
multiplicity revealed to the senses as inhering in a substance.
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Through this process, we impose upon becoming a view of the world
as one unchanging unit. If the totality of conditions were known, the world
could be seen as a single unconditioned thing (I:271). But this attempt to
impose being onto becoming fails. A simple unchanging substance can
never connect with the becoming it is supposed to explain (I:327, II:130-31).
Thus, Spir argues, to think about change we must deny that it is an essential
characteristic of the world. Change is, in the end, an inexplicable deviation
from being. Truly doing justice to change – that is, seeing it other than in the
light of being – would simply mean giving up thinking about change at all,
treating it as having no explanation (II:132).
The problem of thinking change is evident in Spir’s discussion of force:
By force one means the actual driving effectuating principle of becoming. This makes
it sound as if force is the cause of change. Only this view is indefensible. The driving
principle is not something different from or separate from change itself, but rather,
so to speak, simply the power of constancy [Beharrungsvermögen] of the general
change, its inner impulse to continue moving forward. (II:132)

The idea of force is an attempt to get at the “driving principle” of the succession
of appearances (II:138 footnote). It is the attempt to get behind causal laws,
which deny that change is essential to reality, and explain what it is that
actually drives change. Force cannot be thought of as the cause of change,
because that would mean conceiving force as a necessary relation between
changes, that is, in the light of being.
Spir anticipates Nietzsche’s own views when he argues that someone
who considered change to be essential to the world would offer a theory of
“absolute becoming” [“ein absolutes Werden”] (I:212-15). Such a theorist
would be inclined to understand change in terms of individual Boscovichean
centers of force (II: 112-13). Spir argues, however, that an individual force –
which would be “an inexhaustible source of always-new changes” (II:134)
– is contradictory. If one used such a force to explain why a particular change
had to happen, one is actually thinking causally in terms of a relation between
changes, which means denying that change is essential to the world (II:13335). The only other option appears to be giving up on explaining change at all.
Those who claim that the world is actually becoming face a choice “between
logical contradictions, that is, mental suicide, on one hand” [a position Spir
associates with Hegel] and “the acceptance of the incomprehensibility of the
world on the other” (I:292).
With this problem of representing absolute becoming as individual
force in mind, we can now consider how someone committed to Nietzsche’s
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version of Spirean falsificationism might think that ER could allow absolute
becoming to be thought. Assume that ER is true. Time is a circle: the chain
of causal consequences of an event bends forward to before the event and
becomes its cause. And the chain of causal antecedents of an event bends
backward to after the event and becomes its consequence.
Someone placing the movement of a billiard ball in the context of ER is
not simply giving up on explaining change. Change is thought – for it is linked
to other changes under a covering law. Change is, so to speak, pushed out of
one event and into another. But rather than continuing on into infinity – the
sign, Spir argues, of the inability to connect becoming to the unconditioned
(II:143-44) – it returns to itself. By representing a change as its own effect and
its own cause, ER represents what could not be represented more directly by
the concept of individual force, that is, something arising from nothing and
disappearing into nowhere, an inexhaustible source of always new changes.
By treating change as returning to itself, ER is, as Nietzsche put it, “the
closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being.”22
Spir on Pain and Dissatisfaction
The role of ER in Nietzsche’s thought is not, of course, primarily
epistemological. It was, instead, understood by him as a test of lifeaffirmation. I shall argue, however, that someone who held Nietzsche’s form
of Spirean falsificationism would also see a need for ER in order to truly
affirm life. The key to my interpretation is Spir’s third argument in Denken
und Wirklichkeit for the highest law of thought.
The highest law of thought is simply Spir’s falsificationism: the insight
that reality is an unconditioned unity that cannot be connected to the plurality
and becoming that we experience through the senses (I:199). Spir’s first and
second arguments for the law proceed from the relativity of empirical objects
(I:185-205) and from the nature of change (II:206-220). Given what we already
know about Spir, these first two arguments are unsurprising. Both change and
relativity (by which Spir means the fact that empirical objects depend upon
one another for being the way they are) demand and forbid a connection to
being. Without such a connection, relativity and change are inexplicable –
there are no relata to relate, no things to become. But being is an absolutely

22 WP 617, KSA 12:7[54] (End of 1886-Spring 1887). This reading is similar to Heidegger’s description
Nietzsche as attempting to “represent transience as a fixed becoming within the eternal recurrence of the
same, and so to render it secure and stable.” Heidegger, 1977, pp. 64, 75.
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simple Parmenidean One that cannot connect to the relationships and change
it is supposed to explain.
Spir’s third argument is based on the nature of feelings of pain and
dissatisfaction.23 Spir argues that “[t]he same thing that the [fundamental] law
of thought speaks in the realm of thought, dissatisfaction speaks in the realm
of feelings, namely this: In the true essence of things there reigns complete
self-identity” (I:223-24). Here Spir’s argument does not proceed from the
perspective of ourselves as thinkers about that presented in sensation, but
from the perspective of ourselves as agents. Indeed, Spir does not treat pain
and dissatisfaction as sensed at all, although pain can be accompanied by
sensations, which give it its particular quality, for example, of being sharp
or dull (II:192-93). Rather, pain and dissatisfaction are the “living source of
change itself” (I:222), the “source of all striving and action” (II:199). In this
sense, they are force (II:161-62).24
Spir’s argument, as I understand it, is that as agents we have direct
awareness of our two-fold nature as both being and becoming. Becoming is
provided by dissatisfaction – a drive to change (“Trieb zur Veränderung”).
Dissatisfaction is a state that cannot remain the same (“der sich selbst nicht
gleich bleiben kann”) (I:222; II:204). In itself, it has no goal except to move
forward. Only when it is taken up by the representing self can one act with a
purpose (Zweck), for purpose requires the representation of one’s goal (II:15960; II:204).
But these two elements – the becoming moving us to act and the being of
the self that represents what is to be done (II:173-74) – cannot connect. Insofar
as I can represent a goal that could be brought to completion, insofar as I
have a unity of action over time, I am being. But insofar as I can do anything,
generate any change in the world, I am becoming. The conflict between being
and becoming that we recognize intellectually in empirical judgment we feel
in ourselves through our own agency, which tells us that our true nature is
being and that becoming is abnormal (II:209-10). It is for this reason that
we feel our drive to act as pain and dissatisfaction, that is, as states that seek

23 Spir speaks of “Schmerz- und Unlustgefühle” (I:221). I have translated “Unlust” as “dissatisfaction”
because it captures the fact that Spir speaks of it as encompassing any drive for change. By “Lust” he
means satisfaction with the actual, which expresses itself in the struggle against change (II:198).
24 Spir takes care to distinguish the force driving our actions from the will, but that is because the will is not
simply the aimless striving of dissatisfaction, but action that proceeds through representations of the world.
It is for this reason, Spir argues, that one cannot take the similarity between the will and force as a reason
to adopt teleological interpretations of nature (II:161-62).
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to annul [aufzuheben] or negate [vernichten] themselves (I:222). Becoming
condemns itself in our own agency.
This felt recognition of the fundamental law of thought through pain and
dissatisfaction, Spir argues, is religiosity (I:224-25). In religiosity we feel that
becoming is an inexplicable deviation from the perfection (Vollkommenheit)
and self-identity of being, which Spir identifies as God (I:358), and that our
true goal is self-identity:
Because all willing [Wollen] and striving [Streben]... has and can have no other basis
than the presence in us of states that cannot remain the same, implicating a lack
of inner self-identity and a real contradiction, which we feel immediately as pain
and dissatisfaction, the ultimate goal of human willing and striving can be nothing
other than the most possible approximation of inner identity with the self, which is
synonymous with the Good and the Perfect [Vollkommenheit]. (II:146)

This closest approximation is the moral law, which proceeds from the felt
knowledge that our identity as individuals is appearance and that our true
nature is an unconditioned unity (II:210).
In some respects, Spir’s account of agency and his moral philosophy
are like Kant’s. Morality is grounded in the nature of ourselves as we are
in ourselves rather than ourselves, as sensed. Furthermore, like Kant, Spir
argues that rational agency – acting with a purpose – carries recognition of
the moral law within itself. But there are also important differences. For
Kant, the problem with action to satisfy desire – its heteronomous quality –
is that one thereby treats oneself as caused and so as not free. But, for Spir,
the dissatisfaction moving us to act is not a cause at all. It is simply force
– the engine of becoming. Indeed, in another work, Moralität und Religion,
Spir criticized Kant for identifying freedom with force – that is, with the
acausal source of one’s actions. This, Spir argues, is a theory of freedom as
heteronomy.25 For Spir, in contrast, the free self must be a state – it cannot be
a faculty [Vermögen] capable of action at all.26
The result is a Schopenhauerian ascetic quality to Spir’s philosophy (one
I believe was not lost upon Nietzsche). For Spir, all agency is, in a sense,
futile. The becoming that drives us to act is purposeless – it has no goal itself
except ending itself (“überzugehen”) (I:222; II:143-44). To act with a purpose,
to be an agent, a representing subject is needed. But this subject is being and
so cannot connect with what moves it to act. The futility of agency is like
the futility of a causal judgment. While seeking to explain becoming, causal

25 Spir, 1874, pp. 87-94.
26 Ibidem, pp. 94-95.
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judgment merely manages to push becoming into another event, which itself
must be pushed into another event, and so on, endlessly. Likewise, in acting
to achieve my goals, I have merely driven becoming forward into yet another
act, which is itself driven forward into another act, endlessly.
Spir’s philosophy is fundamentally, therefore, a rejection of life. To be
sure, he argues that we can most approximate the self-identity of being when
acting in accordance with the moral law. But it is unclear how this solution is
supposed to work. Such action is still action – it is still driven by becoming.
Although Spir never drew this conclusion himself, the lesson one apparently
should draw from his philosophy is that our goal, even if impossible to be
reached, should be doing nothing – or, better yet, never having existed at all.
Eternal Recurrence and Life-Affirmation
How would one expect someone who held Nietzsche’s inversion of
Spir’s falsificationism to address these same problems of agency and the
value of life? First, such a philosopher would agree with Spir that agency –
acting with a purpose – involves the conflict between being and becoming.
The drive leading one to act is becoming, but the agent – the representing
subject that can identify the goal of action and persist to completion – is
being. Unlike Spir, however, Nietzsche would argue that our true identity is
becoming. The unity of the agent is a deception created within becoming.
But how can this becoming be affirmed? Won’t any affirmation be in the
light of a goal, a purpose that becoming serves for us? And won’t this goal
itself be a condemnation of becoming in the light of being? Just as it seems
that the only way we can think becoming as essential to the world is by giving
up thought, so it seems that the only way we can affirm becoming in our
agency is by giving up agency and letting our drives flow through us without
any thought of why we are doing what we do.
It is here that ER can play a role. Someone acting in the context of ER is
not acting without purpose. His thoughts are directed outside the moment of
action, toward the future. And yet, because time is a circle, the goal returns to
the moment of action itself. Through ER, life – the purposeless striving of the
moment – can itself be our goal and so be affirmed.
Conclusion
I would like to end with a brief discussion of how this reading of ER
answers a number of puzzles about its role in Nietzsche’s thought.
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The first puzzle has been highlighted by Paul Loeb. Let us assume, as
most believe, that Nietzsche did not think ER is in fact true of our lives. Given
this is so, why does my greeting ER with joy mean that I have affirmed life?
How can adding ER to my non-recurring life show that I have affirmed that
life? It would seem to show that I have not affirmed it, since I greet my life
with joy only by adding something to it that it doesn’t have.27
One might argue that I affirm my non-recurring life by adding ER to it
because, by adding ER, I have made it worse than it is. If, with the introduction
of this negative element, I still affirm it, then my level of life-affirmation
must be especially high. As an analogy, let us assume that I hate movies with
Nicolas Cage in them. (Indeed one need not assume this is so: I do, in fact,
hate them.) If, despite this hatred, I would say yes to my life if I had to watch
a Nicolas Cage movie every day, I must really love life.
But this reading can’t be right, for Nietzsche understands one as having
passed the test of life-affirmation only if one’s attitude toward ER itself is
positive. One affirms life with ER, not life despite it. But that reintroduces
Loeb’s challenge: How does the fact that I affirm my life by adding something
positive that it doesn’t have show that I affirm my actual life?
As Bernard Reginster has noted, this problem would be solved if ER is
necessary to allow us to affirm a fundamental aspect of life, namely that it is
becoming. But why, he asks, can’t I simply recognize the way the world is –
namely that it becomes – and say yes to it?28 My reading, relying as it does on
Spir’s falsificationism, solves this puzzle, for it shows why the affirmation of
becoming is so difficult – why Nietzsche thought an indirect approach like ER
was necessary.
The second puzzle about ER is that most people’s response to the doctrine
is quite different from how Nietzsche describes it. Most people would respond
to ER with simple indifference, not joy or despair.29 What does it matter to
me, situated as I am within my life, whether my life, as a whole, recurs? Who
cares?
Consider someone whose life project is to build a tower and who sees
the success or failure of her life in terms of that project. She is going to be
indifferent to ER. When she imagines herself succeeding in her project, she
will think of her life positively and when she imagines herself failing, she will

27 “[T]here is a deep inconsistency in the scholarly consensus that we affirm our non-recurring lives by
craving their eternal recurrence” (Loeb, forthcoming).
28 Reginster, 2006, p. 223.
29 E.g., Soll, 1973, p. 322.
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think of her life negatively. The fact that her life – with her project – recurs
will neither add to, nor subtract from that. Since that is how most of us think
of our lives, most of us will not care about whether ER is true.
But under my reading, the fact that most people would be indifferent to
ER makes perfect sense. Simply adding the fact of ER to my life does not
force upon me the test of life affirmation. Rather, ER functions as it does only
for someone who has recognized the conflict in human agency between the
drives that move us to act and the unity of ourselves as actors. It is only a Spir,
a Schopenhauer, or a Nietzsche – that is, someone who has concluded that
the goals of one’s life incoherently seek to bridge becoming and being – who
would be tested by the prospect of ER.
As an analogy, consider the epistemological role that ER can play. Most
people making causal judgments are perfectly satisfied with stopping the
explanation of an effect with a particular cause. The problem – expressed in the
Kantian antinomies – that the very fact of becoming has not been answered by
such an explanation is untroubling. ER is not going to matter to such a person.
Only someone like Nietzsche – who has adopted a philosophical outlook and
recognized that the bridge between being and becoming that causal judgments
seek cannot be fulfilled – would find ER useful.
The third puzzle is the curious fact that ER, despite being presented
by Nietzsche as his most significant doctrine, is not well integrated into his
philosophy as a whole. As a result, those, like Brian Leiter, who read Nietzsche
as a naturalist, with a naturalized theory of cognition and agency, are able to
present his thoughts on knowledge, freedom, and morality without discussing
ER in any detail.
Again, this is just what one would expect under my reading. ER is tied
to the Spirean falsificationist theme in Nietzsche’s writings. To the extent that
Nietzsche offered a naturalistic approach instead, ER has no place. And I think
it is unquestionably true that Nietzsche did offer a naturalistic approach, even
if falsificationism can be found in his writings up to the very end.
As we have seen, under a naturalized theory of cognition, judgments
about causality or substance do not falsify, for they do not presuppose any
antinaturalist unity of the thinking subject. By the same token, a naturalistic
Nietzsche would not understand agency as presupposing such a subject, and
so would not treat agency as possessing the contradiction Spir attributed to
it. For such a Nietzsche, there is no puzzle in affirming life in the light of the
particular projects or goals within one’s life.
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